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SECTION 10(j) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE,
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL LOOK AT A
POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE (BUT SELDOM
USED) REMEDY
INTRODUCTION
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), I declaring that it would be the policy of this coun-
try to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.2
Pursuant to this policy declaration, Congress created the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) and in-
vested it with the power to investigate and to remedy charges
of unfair labor practices (ULP's). One tool at the Board's dis-
posal in carrying out its investigatory and remedial functions
is section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act.' Under
section 10(j), the Board has the authority to seek a temporary
injunction from a federal district court whenever it deter-
1. Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1970 & Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter referred to as NLRAI.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). With the passage of the 1947 amendments to the
NLRA, known as Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), ch. 120, §
101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970), Congress restated
in § 141(b) the purpose of the NLRA:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full
flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the
legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employ-
ees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect com-
merce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and manage-
ment which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and
to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affect-
ing commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970). See text accompanying note 36 infra for the text of
the statute.
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mines that temporary relief is necessary to effectuate the
policies of the NLRA.4
In the past thirty years, the Board has used the broad
congressional mandate of section 10(j) infrequently.' In the
first fifteen years of section 10(j)'s statutory life the Board
sought the injunction an average of only three times per year.,
The infrequent use of secton 10(j) can be traced in part to an
administrative policy of "restricted use" which, until recent
years, dominated the attitude of the Board's senior officers
towards the injunction. In restricting the use of section 10(j) to
what they generally considered only extraordinary situations,
the officers based their attitudes not upon expressed congres-
sional criteria or judicial interpretations, but upon their own
interpretation of the legislative intent behind congressional
enactment of section 10(j).1
The federal courts have also contributed to ineffective uti-
lization of section 10(j) injunctions by their indecisiveness as
to the standards which should be used in determining whether
to grant or to deny a Board's petition for injunctive relief. Be-
cause so few section 10(j) injunctions were sought by the Board
in the early history of the section, it was not until the last
4. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970). Generally the cases brought under § 10(j) involve
situations where the violations are clear and flagrant, and where immediate relief
seems necessary because a subsequent Board order or court decree would be inade-
quate to remedy the injury. Congress was not explicit as to which violations of the Act
they considered serious enough to warrant a § 10(j) injunction. But see S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR SENATE COMM.
ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT 1947, at 414 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA],
where a glimmer of congressional intent is available:
[Tihe Committee has concluded that five specific practices by labor
organizations and their agents, affecting commerce, should be defined as
unfair labor practices. Because of the nature of certain of these practices,
especially jurisdictional disputes, and secondary boycotts and strikes for
specifically defined objectives, the committee is convinced that addi-
tional procedures must be made available under the National Labor Re-
lations Act in order adequately to protect the public welfare which is
inextricably involved in labor disputes. (Emphasis added).
Acts constituting Unfair Labor Practices (ULP's) are defined in 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970
& Supp. V 1975).
5. The scope of relief obtainable under a § 10(j) injunction is broad and may
enjoin conduct by the employer, the union, or both. Douds v. Anhauser-Busch Inc.,
99 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1951). See note 29 and accompanying text infra for the annual
totals of § 10(j) petitions authorized by the Board.
6. 13 NLRB ANN. REP. (1948) to 26 NLRB ANN. REP. (1961). See note 29 and
accompanying text infra for the annual totals of § 10(j) petitions authorized by the
Board.
7. See notes 47-87 and accompanying text infra.
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decade that appellate courts began to address themselves to
the standards the district courts must use in determining the
necessity of granting a Board's petition for section 10(j) relief.'
This comment will discuss the congressional intent behind
the enactment of section 10(j), the evolution of its use by the
NLRB, and the current revolution among the appellate courts
to give meaning to the vague standards provided by the stat-
ute.
CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE IN THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 10(j)
In litigation arising from labor disputes, failure to obtain
prompt action can often result in a denial of effective relief and
can act to undermine the stated NLRA objectives-the encour-
agement of collective bargaining and the elimination of ob-
structions to the free flow of commerce created by labor-
management strife.' Most unfair labor practice cases follow a
long and tortuous path to final remedy. Unless a case is settled
at some stage of the proceedings, relief may be unavailable to
the injured party for more than a year.
In 1957, the average time from the filing of a complaint
alleging an unfair labor practice to a Board decision was 475
days, and another 396 days for judicial enforcement."i In 1961
it took 393 days to process a ULP petition," and by 1975, the
time had been reduced even further to 324 days," but could
take several years if the Board's decision was taken to the
appellate courts. 3
8. See notes 88-158 and accompanying text infra.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141(b), 151 (1970). See note 2 supra.
10. ADvisoRY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS LAW, REPORT TO THE SEN-
ATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Cox PANEL REPORT].
11. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 87th CONG., 1st SESS., REPORT
ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr BY THE NLRB, SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 15 (1961) [hereinafter cited as PUCINSKI COMM. REPORT].
12. Appropriations, Dept. of Labor, Fiscal 1976: Hearing on H.R. 6069 Before the
Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 3296, 3322 (1975).
13. In the case of General Electric's dispute with the IUE, discussed in text
accompanying notes 133-152 infra, the unfair labor practice occurred on May 4, 1966,
and the district court passed favorably on the § 10(j) petition on August 18, 1966.
McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 366 F.2d 847 (2d
Cir. 1966), rev'd & remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967). The NLRB did not decide the case
until October 23, 1968, over two and a half years after the ULP occurred. General
Electric Co. and International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
CIO, 173 NLRB 46 (1968).
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During that period, the employer or employees may con-
tinue to suffer the burden of illegal activity engaged in by the
other. Recognizing that delays of such length make it difficult
to carry out the policies of the NLRA and influenced by the
economic disruptions caused by labor unrest in the post World
War II period, 4 Congress added section 10(j) to the NLRA.
Congressional Guidance
Congress, it would appear, intended to give the Board dis-
cretionary power in its use of section 10(j) by incorporating into
the statute only one guideline for the Board and district courts
to follow-section 10(j) provides for granting an injunction
whenever "just and proper."' 5
The legislative history is equally void of standards or
guidelines. As explained in the Senate Report on the bill which
was to become section 10(j):
[t]ime is usually of the essence in these matters and con-
sequently the relative slow procedure of the Board hearing
and order, followed many months later by an enforcing
decree of the circuit court of appeals, falls short of achiev-
ing the desired objective-the prompt elimination of the
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and encourage-
ment of the practice and procedure of free private collec-
tive bargaining. Hence we have provided that the Board,
acting in the public interest and not in vindication of
purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case
of all types of unfair labor practices ....
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act
Several years prior to the lengthy General Electric litigation, the Pucinski Sub-
committee concluded its hearings expressing a finding in its final report that:
there is much needless delay in enforcement of Labor Board orders [with
the result that] the losing party delays, lingers, and waits because diso-
bedience of a Labor Board order is not punishable until it is enforced by
court action.
PUCINSKI COMM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
Similarly, a year earlier the Cox Advisory Panel stated that an average of two
years and four months is too long for a wronged party to endure denial of rights
guaranteed by the Congress, since a remedy granted after such a time lapse "will bear
little relation to the human situation which gave rise to the need for Government
intervention." Cox Panel Report, supra note 10, at 2.
14. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, LMRA, supra note 4, at 294-97. See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
8 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA, supra note 4, at 414. Section 10(j)
was enacted to meet the relatively slow procedure of the Board's administrative pro-
cess. See note 16 and accompanying text infra.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970).
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has demonstrated that by reason of lengthy hearing and
litigation enforcing its order, the Board had not been able
in some instances to correct unfair labor practices until
after substantial injury has been done .... [I]t has some-
times been possible for persons violating the act to accom-
plish their unlawful objective before being placed under
any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not
feasible to restore or preserve the status quo pending litiga-
tion.'"
Except for the brief remarks of the members of Congress
who opposed or supported the enactment of section 10(j),'1
there is no other legislative history from which the congres-
sional intent can be gleaned.
The lack of congressional guidance in either the statute or
the legislative history of section 10(j) is remarkable when con-
sidered in relation to the use of labor injunctions during the
first half of this century.'" Prior to 1932, labor injunctions were
frequently used by the federal courts to provide a cooling-off
period in labor-management disputes.'9 The flagrant abuses of
the injunction, however, particularly against labor organiza-
tions," led Congress in 1932 to impose severe restrictions on the
scope of labor injunctions available to the federal courts. These
restrictions are embodied in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.2'
The congressional attitude which opposed the labor in-
16. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, LMRA, supra note 4, at 414, 433. These excerpts are the only parts of § 10(j)'s
legislative history that substantively discuss the section. The House version of the
Labor Management Relations Act did not contain § 100): the Senate version (S. 1126)
contained § 10(j) in substantially similar language to that in which it was enacted. See
Siegel, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested Reforms for an
Expanded Use, 13 B.C. INDUS. CoM. L. REv. 457, 465 n.43 (1972); see also Comment,
Temporary Injunctions Under Section 10(j) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv.
181, 190-92 (1969).
17. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
18. For a comprehensive history of the use of the labor injunction prior to the
1930's, see generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). For
an excellent brief history of the use of labor injunctions in the last 100 years, see
McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations
Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 84-90 (1962).
19. McCulloch, supra note 18; F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970). The Act was passed
to restrict the ability of the federal courts to issue injunctions against concerted activ-
ity in labor disputes. However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibitions against the use
of injunctions in labor disputes have been found not to apply to temporary injunctions
sought under § 10(j). Douds v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 294, 75
F. Supp. 414, 418 (N.D.N.Y. 1947). See also 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1970), which impliedly
exempts § 10(j) injunctions from Norris-LaGuardia prohibitions.
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junction, and supported the Norris-LaGuardia Act, is epito-
mized best in the words of Representative O'Connor of New
York who, during the debate on the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
stated "[sluch an uncivilized and tyrannical procedure can-
not possibly be longer tolerated."" The Act virtually elimi-
nated federal court jurisdiction to enjoin specific conduct if the
action involved or arose out of a labor dispute. 3 The effective-
ness of the Act in drastically reducing the number of injunc-
tions is evidenced by the fact that prior to 1932 the federal
courts had issued 508 labor injunctions; subsequent to the Act
the number dropped to an average of less than two labor in-
junctions per year.2
Because pre-Norris-LaGuardia injunctions were used pri-
marily against labor organizations, the opponents of the pro-
posed section 10(j) amendment to the NLRA raised old fears
that the section 10(j) injunctions would be used to defeat em-
ployee organization. Visions that section 10(j) would "bring
back once more the hated injunction from which labor through
the Norris-LaGuardia Act had forever freed it" surfaced in
congressional debates.25
Other opponents of section 10(j) predicted that the Board's
effectiveness would decrease significantly because it would be
"harrassed by demands that it seek immediate injunctive relief
if unfair labor practices were alleged by either employees or
employers."2 The section's supporters, however, appeared to
be most concerned with reducing the time for granting relief to
the sufferers of unfair labor practices as well as decreasing the
time and money spent in processing ULP charges."
Neither the hopes of the section's proponents nor the fear
of its opponents materialized as each had envisioned. It was not
until 1962 that the Board, with additional congressional prod-
ding," began using the section 10(j) injunction with enough
22. 75 CONG. REc. 5463 (1932).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
24. McCulloch, supra note 18, at 90.
25. 93 CONG. REC. 6542 (1947).
26. S. MINORITY REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 18 (1947), reprinted
in LGIsLATivE HIsToRY, LMRA, supra note 4, at 480.
27. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, LMRA, supra note 4, at 433.
28. PUCINSKI COMM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-3. These 1961 Committee hear-
ings held by Congressman Pucinski appear to have been the catalyst to the Board's
authorizing more frequent use of the § 10() injunction. In making its recommendations
for more frequent use of § 10(j), the Pucinski Committee was well aware of past abuses
of injunctive relief:
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frequency to make a dent in the Board's case load.2" An addi-
tional fifteen years then elapsed before the injunction was used
The names of Norris and LaGuardia are constant reminders of the dan-
gers inherent in conducting labor-management relations by way of in-
junction. Nevertheless, this subcommittee finds that injunctions are now
utilized extensively against union activities and to an almost nonexistent
extent against employer unfair labor practices.
Id. at 964.
29. The following table shows the number of § 10(j) authorizations approved by
the NLRB during the past 30 years. It should be noted that not all § 10(j) authoriza-
tions granted by the Board are filed with the district courts either because of settle-
ment or adjustment prior to petitioning to the courts.
Fiscal
Year
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977*
Total
Authorizations
Sought
Against
Union
3
1
4
2
1
4
1
1
1
6
4
3
1
2
7
4
6
4
2
1
2
6
3
9
4
3
8
6
6
Sought
Against
Employer
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
8
7
14
8
13
17
11
11
9
8
10
3
12
13
14
31
Sought
Against
Employer
& Union
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
3
4
2
2
2
2
2
7
* The figures for 1977 have been compiled from Office of the General Counsel, NLRB,
Release No. R-1512 (Aug. 15, 1977), reprinted in [1977] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9132:
Release No. R-1518 (Oct. 20, 1977), reprinted in [1977] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9135:
Release No. R-1524 (Jan. 4, 1978), reprinted in [1978] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9143:
Release No. R-1536 (May 16, 1978), reprinted in [1978] 4 LAB. L. RE. (CCH) 9156
(Quarterly Reports of the General Counsel). Other figures compiled from 13 NLRB
ANN. REP. (1948) to 41 NLRB ANN. REP. (1976).
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in sufficient numbers to approach the scope envisioned by its
early supporters."
Because section 10(j) not only fails to explicitly define the
district court's role in granting an injunction, but also vests the
Board with broad discretion to seek section 10(j)injunctions, 3'
it would appear that the section could be used as a swift, non-
discriminatory labor remedy. Two hurdles have combined,
however, to impede more effective utilization of the section.
The first was the NLRB's own reluctance to use the injunction
with any enthusiasm or consistency during the period between
1947 and 1962.32 The second hurdle was the lack of clear stan-
dards by which the district courts could test the necessity for
relief.3 3 Contributing to the latter problem was the vague lan-
guage (i.e., "just and proper") in the statute, and the inconclu-
siveness of the section's legislative history. 4
Before examining the evolution of the Board's policy on
the use of section 10(j) injunctions and the current revolution
among the federal courts to develop a standard for granting the
injunction, this comment will briefly discuss the Board's proce-
dures for seeking relief under the section. An outline of the
procedures35 for processing an unfair labor practice complaint
will demonstrate the potential impact of section 10(j).
PROCEDURAL STEPS IN SEEKING 10(j) RELIEF
Processing a ULP
Section 10(j) states that the Board shall have
power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor
practice, to petition any United States district court,
within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in
question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person
resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such peti-
30. See note 29, supra. Especially note the years from 1962 to the present, when
the petitions annually authorized increased six times over the previous fifteen-year
period.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970).
32. See notes 47-87 and accompanying text infra.
33. See notes 88-158 and accompanying text infra.
34. See notes 15-26 and accompanying text supra.
35. Compiled from NLRB, STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURES, §§ 101.2-.16 (1973);
NLRB, CASEHANDL1NG MANUAL 88 10310-10312 (1975); and Comment, The Use of Sec-
tion 10(j) of the Labor-Management Relations Act in Employer Refusal-to-Bargain
Cases, 1976 UNIV. OF ILL. LAW FORUM 845, 845-47.
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tion the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon
such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant
to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as
it deems just and proper."
A typical ULP action begins when a complaint is filed by
a union or employer with an NLRB regional office. The regional
director, as an agent of the General Counsel of the Board, in-
vestigates the charge and issues a complaint to the accused
party. After a hearing, at which both parties involved in the
dispute may present arguments, the presiding administrative
law judge issues a decision. However, there are no legal sanc-
tions through which the prevailing party can compel immedi-
ate compliance with the administrative decision. After the de-
cision, the parties may file briefs, exceptions, and requests for
oral argument before the Board. The Board, after considering
the findings of the administrative law judge and hearing the
arguments of both parties, issues an opinion and order. The
Board order, however, is not self-enforcing. If a party fails or
refuses to comply with the terms of the order, the Board must
then seek an enforcement decree from a federal court of ap-
peals. If the decree is granted, further failure or refusal to com-
ply with the Board order subjects the violator to punishment
for contempt. Thus, in proceedings to adjudicate ULPs, the
issuance of an enforcement decree marks the first stage where
the guilty party has an incentive to terminate the unlawful
conduct. However, few ULP cases reach that stage of the pro-
ceedings within a year.37
Section 10(j) gives the Board the discretionary power to
petition a federal district court for relief from the effects of an
ULP which the Board determines may continue during the
course of the administrative and court proceedings.38
The Board has sole authority to determine whether to peti-
tion the district court for section 10(j) relief. Private parties
have no right to petition for relief under section 10(j). 31 If the
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1970).
37. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
38. The Board's petition must allege that the following conditions exist: (1) an
unfair labor practice charge has been filed; (2) a complaint has been issued; (3) the
facts presented support the charge; (4) there is a likelihood that the unfair labor
practice will continue unless restrained; (5) the district court has jurisdiction; and (6)
the persons sought to be restrained are subject to the Act. D. McDowLh & K. HUHN,
NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRtcncas 252-55 (1974).
39. The specific grant of authority to the Board to seek temporary injunctions
has been interpreted by the courts to deny private parties standing to petition a district
court for § 10(j) relief. See Squillacote v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace
19781 1029
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Board is granted a petition for section 10(j) relief, the initial
complaint follows the normal procedures to a final Board order.
During the course of the normal proceeding, however, the com-
plaining party receives temporary relief from the alleged ULP.'0
In the absence of temporary relief and prior to the issuance
of an enforcement decree by a court of appeals, an employer or
union could continue to engage in unfair labor practices with-
out fear of legal sanction. For example, if an employer, either
by intimidation or discriminatory discharges, interferes with
his employees' attempts to organize a collective bargaining
unit, the employer could, without penalty, refuse to cease his
activities. Even if the employees filed section 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) charges,4 the employer could continue his activities
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491 (E.D.
Wis. 1974), where the court stated that the power to initiate § 10(j) injunctive suits
under the NLRA is restricted to the Board. The employer in Squillacote based its
motion to intervene in the Board's petition for a § 10(j) injunction on FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a). The Court noted that Rule 24(a) requires the intervening party's interest to be
inadequately represented by the existing parties. However, the court found that this
requirement ;vas not present in the case, and went on to say:
It is hard to conceive how the charging party's interest will not be ade-
quately represented by the Board. The only real interest intended to be
protected by 10(0) injunctive proceedings is the public's interest. The
Board's petition for injunction does not concern itself with the interests
of the charging party.
383 F. Supp. at 492.
Private parties charging that a ULP has been committed, however, may request
at the time they file the charge with the NLRB that the Board petition a district court
for temporary relief in addition to issuing a complaint. NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL,
supra note 35, §§ 10310,-.1. However, the manual adds that "it should be kept in mind
that such relief is discretionary, not mandatory." Id. at § 10310. In a 1948 Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals case, the ourt in dictum said that perhaps in unusual cases
private parties may sue for temporary injunctive relief from ULP's. Amazon Cotton
Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union of America, 167 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1948). There
appears to be no reported case which has relied on this dictum and allowed the issu-
ance of a private party-petitioned § 10(j) injunction. See also S. REP. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA, supra note 4, at 414.
"IThe Board, acting in the public interest and not in vindication of purely private
rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case of all types of unfair labor practices." Id.
40. When temporary injunctive relief under § 10(j) is ordered, it remains in effect
until final adjudication on the hearing of the charge and the issuance of the cease and
desist order. However, the Third Circuit has established a rule in that circuit limiting
the life of a § 10(j) injunction to six months, renewable upon petition by the Board for
an additional six months if necessary to permit Board action on the administrative law
judge's decision. Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1975). The
court also ruled that a § 10(j) injunction can be extended for 30 days at any time upon
a showing that Board action is imminent.
41. Section 8(a) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), or to discriminate in regard to hire, or tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment, or to encourage or discourage
NLRA SECTION 10(J)
without fear of legal sanction prior to the issuance of an en-
forcement decree by the court of appeals. In contrast, if a dis-
trict court immediately after a complaint is filed grants section
10(j) relief, although the section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) charges
will be resolved through normal procedures, the employer is
enjoined from continuing his conduct toward the employees in
the interim.
Processing a Section 10(j) Injunction
In 1947, Congress granted the Board the power to seek
injunctions under the terms of section 10(j). While the Board
retains the ultimate authority to decide whether or not to seek
an injunction, the decision is usually made by the General
Counsel's office. When a regional director believes that section
10(j) proceedings should be initiated in an unfair labor prac-
tice case, the director transmits his recommendations to the
General Counsel's office. If such relief appears to be warranted,
a memorandum requesting such authorization is submitted by
the General Counsel to the Board. The memorandum sets forth
the facts, the legal analysis establishing the violation, the
reasons why section 10(j) relief is considered necessary, and the
specific interim relief to be requested. If the Board authorizes
the seeking of injunctive relief, the regional office is immedi-
ately notified so that it may institute injunction proceedings.'
membership in any labor organization, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Section 7 states:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the .purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
42. Procedure described in NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 35, §§
10310-10312. See also IRVING, Remedies and Compliance - Putting More Teeth Into the
Act, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1977, at 355, 359
(1977). Irving was appointed General Counsel of the NLRB in December, 1976. After
the appointment, two changes were made by Irving in the manner in which the General
Counsel's office processes § 10(j) requests. The first change affects the way in which
the regional office communicates the request for injunctive relief to the Division of
Advice. As discussed by Irving, the traditional manner of processing § 10(j) cases
involved the submission of a recommendation from the regional director, the review
of that recommendation by the General Counsel's Office (Division of Advice), and
where injunctive relief was deemed to be warranted, the preparation of a memorandum
to that effect by the Division of Advice. Assuming that the General Counsel concurred
with the Division's view, he would sign the memorandum and submit it to the Board.
Id. at 359. In 1976, Irving instructed the regional directors to write their future recom-
mendations for § 100) injunctive relief in a manner appropriate for direct submission
to the Board. If the General Counsel concurs, the recommendation is then sent directly
to the Board with little or no revision. This revised submission procedure is expected
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The regional director may then go into a federal district
court, which does not act on the merits of the case but only
determines if there is reasonable cause to believe the NLRA has
been violated, and, if so, whether injunctive relief is just and
proper.4 3 Until recently, even when a regional director deter-
mined that temporary relief was warranted, the Board rarely
authorized the institution of section 10(j) proceedings.
The primary hurdle in the administrative process ap-
peared to be at the stage where the General Counsel's office
received the regional director's request." In the fifteen years
prior to 1962 fewer than sixty petitions were actually filed with
the Board by the General Counsel, although requests by re-
gional directors for section 10(j) authorizations were usually
ten times that number. 5 Since the Board rarely rejects the
recommendations of the General Counsel's office,4" it would
appear that the General Counsel's summary denial of the re-
gional director's requests had been hampering the role of sec-
tion 10(j) injunctions as envisioned by the legislative history.
Recently, however, the General Counsel's office has signifi-
cantly altered its position on section 10(j) injunctions, leading
to their increased use. Since section 10(j) injunctions can play
a pivotal role in disputes concerning labor practices, this
change in philosophy could have far reaching consequences.
EVOLUTON OF THE BOARD'S PHILOSOPHY
Introduction
A major force in shaping the early attitude of the Board
about section 10(j) injunctions was General Counsel Robert
Denham. 7 Apparently influenced by the fears that were ex-
pressed by the supporters of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Den-
to expedite the processing for § 10(j) relief. Id. at 360.
The second change made by Irving was the appointment of a Deputy Assistant
General Counsel who will have the responsibility to monitor all § 10(j) requests made
by regional directors. Id.
43. See notes 88-100 and accompanying text infra. The court does not pass upon
the ultimate merits of the ULP, Douds v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union,
Local 1, 75 F.Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), nor does the court's ruling control or bind
the Board in its subsequent decision on the merits of the case, NLRB v. Denver Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
44. Siegel, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested Reforms
for an Expanded Use, 13 B.C. INDUS. COM. L. REv. 457, 461 (1972).
45. Id.
46. 1 ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION, PROCEEDINGS & COMMITIEE REPORTS 38
(1972)(remarks of Arthur Schiller).
47. Denham served as General Counsel from 1947 to 1950.
1032 [Vol. 18
NLRA SECTION 10(J)
ham carried out a program that resulted in restricted use of the
section 10(j) injunction. He sought only eleven section 10(j)
injunctions during his term as General Counsel,"8 leaving no
record as to why he sought so few. A possible motive for his
actions, can be gleaned from several comments made by him
during the course of his administration. Speaking before the
American Bar Association convention in 1947, Denham stated:
I find it difficult to believe that Congress intended that
injunctive relief woul' be invoked as a preliminary cease
and desist order every time a labor organization is charged
with an unfair labor practice. The history of labor injunc-
tions is too long and reveals too much the national desire
to reduce government by injunction to a minimum to jus-
tify theory other than that this provision is placed in the
Act for emergency puposes and only where loss or damage
or jeopardy to the safety and welfare of a large segment of
the public would result if injunctive action were not taken.
49
Similarly, in a 1948 speech before the Conference of Cir-
cuit and District Judges of the Fifth Circuit, Denham stated:
"[wie feel that this use [of section 10(j) injunctions] must be
limited to instances where the activities sought to be restrained
have wide repercussions and threaten results that affect the
public welfare."0 The next year he underscored that belief by
stating that
section 10(j) should be used with almost the same restraint
that applies to the use of the national emergency injunc-
tions. In other words, the problem has to be a widespread
one; it has to be one that has heavy and meaningful reper-
cussions.5'
48. 13 NLRB ANN. REP. (1948) to 16 NLRB ANN. REP. (1951).
49. I.H. ROTHENBERG, ROTHENBERG ON LABOR RELATIONS 632 n.4 (1949).
50. Id. quoting Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Release No. R-87 (June 4,
1948).
51. NLRB General Counsel Reviews Taft Act Problems - Boycotts, Injunctions,
24 L.R.R.M. 44, 45 (1949). At the same time Denham noted "maybe I don't understand
the law very well, but I don't believe that section 10() was intended to be used by the
General Counsel just for anybody who happened to want something." Id.
Apparently, the type of problem Denham viewed as "widespread" enough to war-
rant a § 10() injunction was to be based upon an arbitrary percentage basis. Shortly
after the enactment of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, Denham issued a policy
statement indicating that he would not use § 10(j) "unless there was something hap-
pening that affected a large segment of the public." PUCINSMK Comm. REPORT, supra
note 11, at 50. See also note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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Even after Denham left the Board, his theories on the
restricted use of section 10(j) were to dominate the Board's
policy of infrequent utilization into the early sixties. An ap-
proach similar to that recommended by Denham in 1947 was
echoed in 1962 by Board Chairman Frank W. McCulloch.2
Chairman McCulloch described the exercise of section 10(j)
power "not as a broad sword, but as a scalpel, ever mindful of
the dangers inherent in conducting labor management rela-
tions by way of injunction."53
The Pucinski Committee Influence
Even as Chairman McCulloch announced his position, the
days of the philosophy of limited section 10(j) use seemed num-
bered. Late in the spring of 1961 Representative Roman Pucin-
ski chaired a congressional subcommittee, which for a year
conducted a series of hearings on the Board's effectiveness
under the NLRA.5' The committee concluded its investigation
in late 1962 indicating that it felt the "failure to utilize the 10(j)
discretionary injunction sometimes results in irreparable in-
jury." 55
During the Pucinski Committee public hearings, critics of
the NLRA repeatedly asserted that section 10(j), along with the
other injunctive provisions of the NLRA, were weighted un-
fairly against labor unions.5" The committee took note of the
fact that during the first fourteen years of section 10(j)'s statu-
tory life, the injunction had been used against labor unions
thirty-two times, and against employers only eleven times.5
Though the committee rejected any notion that equitable jus-
tice can be measured by mechanically balancing the number
of injunctions issued against two opposing factions,5" it did rec-
ommend that
[tihe Labor Board give careful consideration to greater
utilization of the 10(j) injunction in situations when unfair
labor practice charges are filed and the Board finds reason-
52. Appointed as Board Chairman in March 1961; served until June 1970.
53. Address by Chairman Frank W. McCulloch, Eighth Annual Joint Industrial
Relations Conference, Michigan State University (Apr. 19, 1962), reprinted in 49
L.R.R.M. 74, 83 (1962).
54. See note 28 supra.
55. PUCrNSK COMM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 915.
56. Id. at 549.
57. Id. at 527.
58. Id. at 565.
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able cause to believe that such unfair labor practice is
continuing and will be continued unless restrained, and
will cause irreparable property or personal injury or injury
to the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7.11
Furthermore, the committee, unlike its 1947 predecessor,
that enacted section 10(j), gave the Board some guidance for
determining if it should seek an injunction. The committee
suggested that the section should be used in situations of
flagrant and aggravated acts of picket line force and viol-
ence . . . repeated discharge of union adherents . . . em-
ployers or unions flagrantly refus[ing] to bargain in good
faith, and the situations wherein the employer threatens to
intimidate his employees by closing the plant or shifting
work to affiliated factories. 0
Shortly after the conclusion of the Pucinski Committee
hearings, Chairman McCulloch announced that in the future
the Board would seek more section 10(j) injunctions in order to
provide for the more effective administration of the NLRA.1 In
announcing the new Board policy, Chairman McCulloch reem-
phasized his earlier fears when he stated that:
the extraordinary remedy of injunction should not and
cannot become the ordinary remedy in unfair labor prac-
tice cases. Congress delegated to the five-man National
Labor Relations Board sitting in Washington, and not to
the district courts, the duty to give an expert and experi-
enced content and direction to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.6"
Following his new policy statement, McCulloch an-
nounced six guidelines which provided the first indication of
what the Board would look to in deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief. The factors to be considered included:
(1) Whether the case involves application of well-defined
doctrines susceptible to "preemptory" judicial resolution
by "ascertaining the facts" in contrast to those which re-
quire "thorough exploration of sophisticated impondera-
bles concerning motive, conflicting legal principles, and
rival policy factors;"
(2) The doctrine of clean hands;
59. Id. at 916.
60. Id.
61. McCulloch, supra note 18.
62. Id. at 97.
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(3) Whether the charged party is a first offender or a repea-
ter;
(4) The danger of irreparable injury to the parties and to
the public;
(5) Whether failure to seek injunctive relief might "create
disrespect for lawful processes, public agencies, or national
policies;" and
(6) Whether injunctive relief is necessary to effectuate the
policies of the NLRA.13
One critic commented that there could be little quarrel
with a statement of policy "so limited in explication and
clothed in garments of irreproachable intent."'" Since the
Board until recently did not publicly give its justification for
seeking an injunction, it is difficult to speculate how much
influence McCulloch's six policy considerations had on the
Board's philosophy toward utilization of section 10(j). How-
ever, the Pucinski Committee recommendations must have
had some influence, since in the years following the committee
hearings, the Board sought six times as many injunctions as in
the first fifteen years of section 10(j)'s statutory life. 5
Expanded Use Philosophy
During the mid-sixties and early seventies, attention again
focused upon ways of improving the remedial provisions of the
NLRA. In a departure from past improvement discussions, the
courts entered this debate. The judicial concern was primarily
directed at attempting to define standards by which courts
63. Id. at 97-98.
64. Jay, What is New in the Labor Injunction, in 15th ANNUAL N.Y.U. CoNrER-
ENCE ON LABOR 260, 267 (1962). A viewpoint similar to that expressed by Jay about
McCulloch's policy considerations could have been made about the view of § 10(j)
made by the General Counsel, Stuart Rothman (Rothman served as General Counsel
under McCulloch from 1959 to 1963). In 1961 Rothman indicated that his office would
consider using § 10(j) more frequently when its "use is necessary to maintain the status
quo in order to safeguard the statutory rights of individuals." Rothman, Some Law and
Practice Problems Before the Office of the General Counsel NLRB, in 14th ANNUAL
N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 163, 167 (1961).
65. See note 29 supra. Despite the increased use of § 10(j) injunctions during
chairman McCulloch's administration, the Board's overall policy toward the use of §
10(j) appears to have remained similar to that expressed by earlier Board administra-
tors. "The Board has tried, while responding to the criticism contained in the Cox
Report and the Pucinski Committee Report, to keep in mind that the injunction is an
extraordinary remedy which should be reserved for extraordinary situations." Address
by Chairman McCulloch, Federal Bar Ass'n Labor Law Comm. Briefing Conference
on Labor Management Relations (June 13, 1964), reprinted in 56 L.R.R.M. 129, 130
(1964).
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could issue 10(j) injunctions with consistency."
One court, however, went beyond this quest for judicial
standards and chastised the Board for its haphazard use of
section 10(j). The district court in McLeod v. General Electric
Company7 indicated its displeasure with the Board's handling
of section 10(j) cases by stating:
It seems desirable-it would surely be helpful-for the
Board, after nearly twenty years of work with section 10j),
to formulate and state in some form more authoritative
than random speeches by members the criteria by which
it determines whether to proceed under this Section. Such
a formulation would guide the public, the courts, the
Agency itself, and give a measure of assurance that the
action taken in individual cases is reasonably principled.
This is not the first time, of course, that the Board...
[has] been urged to tackle more widely the hard task of
articulating intelligible and knowable rules of general
applicability."
In addition to the judicial concern with the need for con-
sistency, these mid-sixties-early seventies reform discussions
focused on the labor practitioners' worries about the length of
time which elapsed between the filing of a ULP and the ulti-
66. Although the § 10) injunction has been available for use since 1947, it was
not until the mid-sixties that the courts began to attempt to define proper standards
for determining whether the relief was warranted. See notes 88-158 infra. The attitude
of the courts toward the standards of § 10() before the sixties is best described below:
Many of the courts granting [§ 10(j)] injunctions have never confronted
the issue of need for relief. Some courts have apparently assumed that
given reasonable cause to believe a violation has been committed the
issue is not open to judicial question. Others have explicitly stated that
the court must defer to administrative judgment. Most of the cases which
pass beyond the previous two situations nevertheless mechanically apply
the statute to the facts. In many of the cases in which the issue of proper
standards has been raised, and discussed, the need for injunction was so
clear by any standard that no incisive analysis was needed for the hold-
ing; and the cases are easily restricted to their facts.
In the few cases in which the requested injunction has been denied,
the grounds for denial were almost always that the Board failed to show
reasonable cause to believe a violation had been committed. The question
of standards was never approached. In the very few instances in which
an injunction has been denied for lack of need for that injunction, the
court has failed to handle the problem in a clear and helpful fashion.
This is not to suggest that the judicial history of section 10(0) is
devoid of any well-considered discussion of the problem. It is only to
demonstrate that such discussion has not carried the day.
Recent Developments. The 10(j) Labor Injunction: An Exercise in Statutory
Construction, 42 WASH. L. lxv. 1117, 1121-22 (1967) (citations omitted).
67. 257 F. Supp. 690, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
68. Id. at 708 n.14.
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mate resolution of the dispute. A related discussion centered on
how to improve the effectiveness of the NLRA's remedial provi-
sions by preventing either party from enjoying benefits from
their illegal activities while a case was being litigated through
administrative and judicial proceedings.6'
An example of this concern can be found in the words of
former Board Chairman Edward B. Miller, who in 1970 stated
"criticism that our remedies provide too little, too late is
doubtless sometimes valid. But I think the emphasis is more
properly placed on the 'too late' rather than the 'too little'."'
In what appears to have been a response to pressure to
increase the effectiveness of remedies under the Act, in 1976
Board Chairman Betty Southard Murphy71 formed the Chair-
man's Task Force on the National Labor Relations Board
charged with reviewing and evaluating the Board's structure
and processes. 2 Without making any recommendations as to
the use of section 10(j), the Task Force's Interim Report issued
in late 1976 indicated that its union members "take the posi-
tion generally that the Board has used its discretionary power
to authorize section 10(0) injunctions much too sparingly, given
the express Congressional intent that such power be used.""
No further substantive reference to section 10(j) was made in
the report.
In the interim between the Task Force's formation and its
69. See generally J. McDowELL & K. HUHN, supra note 38, at 264.
70. Miller, The NLRB - Hero or Villian?, in SOUTHwESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION,
LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1971, at 317, 325 (1971), reprinted in [19701 LAs. REL. Y.
B. 214, 217 (1971).
71. Murphy served as Chairman from February 1975 to April 1977.
72. The Task Force was established on October 25, 1975, and terminated in
Spring, 1978. As outlined in its charter, the Task Force's objectives were to: (1) review
and evaluate existing structure, practices, procedures, rules, and regulations for the
investigation, prosecution, hearing, decision, and enforcement of cases filed with the
Agency; (2) advise the Board or the General Counsel, where appropriate, of its recom-
mendations on the means and methods of improving the agency's processes; (3) make
recommendations to the Board on the recruitment and productivity of administrative
law judges; and (4) serve as a forum for exchange of ideas and opinions of interested
persons. CHAIRMAN'S TASK FORCE ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RETIONS BOARD, NLRB,
INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Charter Page (1976) [hereinafter referred to
as 1976 INTERIM REPORT], reprinted in [1976] LAB. REL. Y.B. 327 (1976).
73. Id. at 81, [19761 LAB. REL. Y.B. at 364. The task force report also gave its
tacit approval to the changes in the procedure for seeking authorizations adopted
during 1976 by the General Counsel's office. Id. at 43-44 [19761 LAB. REL. Y.B. at 363.
For further discusssion, see note 42 supra, note 82 and accompanying text infra. In 1977
a supplemental report to the 1976 INTERIM REPORT was released and no further refer-
ences or recommendations were made concerning § 10(j). See generally CHAIRMAN'S
TASK FORCE ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1977), reprinted in [1978] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9137.
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first progress report, General Counsel Peter G. Nash7 issued
his Report on 10(j) Proceedings. 5 In the report, Nash disclosed
that he authorized the report "in the interest of providing the
fullest public awareness of the operation of this section 10(j) of
the Act."7 Beyond that explanation, Nash gave no public indi-
cation about why he issued the report. However, the implica-
tion in the first several explanatory pages is that Nash may
have been responding to criticism leveled at the General Coun-
sel's office by the courts."
74. Nash served as General Counsel from 1971 to 1975.
75. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT ON 10(j) PROCEEDINGS, Au-
GUST 1971 - JULY 1 1975 (1975), reprinted in [1975] LAB. REL. Y.B. 310 [hereinafter
referred to as REPORT ON 10(J) PROCEEDINGS]. The report was divided into two sections.
The first section consisted of a survey of the cases in which § 10(j) relief was authorized,
combined with a discussion of the underlying reasons for the authorization request.
The second part of the report consisted of a chart reflecting the history of each authori-
zation from Board approval to, if appropriate, appeal court level.
General Counsel Irving, the present General Counsel (appointed December, 1975),
in the first General Counsel's Office Quarterly Report issued after he was appointed,
indicated that each future Quarterly Report will include a brief summary of the cases
in which the General Counsel's office sought section 100) authorizations. Office of the
General Counsel, NLRB Release No. R-1460 (July 13, 1976).
76. REPORT ON 10(j) PROCEEDINGS, cover letter [1975] LAB. REL. Y.B. at '010.
77. Id. at 2, [1975] LAB. REL. Y.B. at 311. In the report, Nash stated that section
10(j) "reflects the congressional recognition that some unfair labor practice conduct
results in substantial injury which may not or cannot be effectively corrected by the
Board after lengthy litigation." Id.
Nash then went on to point out that the Supreme Court had not yet given
definition to the legislative phrase "just and proper," an overdue task which needed
to be undertaken. However, Nash was quick to state that his office had recently
developed firm standards to determine whether or not to seek injunctive relief. Id. at
3, [1975] LAB. REL. Y.B. at 312. These factors are: (1) the clarity of the alleged
violation; (2) whether the case involves the shutdown of important business operations
which, because of their special nature, would have an extraordinary impact on the
public interest; (3) whether the alleged unfair labor practice involves an unusually
wide geographic area, and thus creates special problems of public concern; (4) whether
the unfair labor practice poses special remedy problems so that resorting solely to the
Act's regular enforcement proceedings would probably render it impossible either to
restore the status quo or to dissipate effectively the consequences of the unfair labor
practice; (5) whether unfair labor practice involves interference with the conduct of
an election or constitutes a clear and flagrant disregard of Board certification of a
bargaining representative or other Board procedure; (6) whether the continuation of
the alleged unfair labor practice will cause exceptional hardship to the charging party;
(7) whether the current unfair labor practice is part of a continuing or repetitious
pattern; (8) whether, if violence is involved, the violence is of such a nature as to be
out of control of local authorities or otherwise widespread and susceptible of control
by 10(j) relief. Id. at 3, [19751 LAB. REL. Y.B. at 312. These eight criteria are now
incorporated in the NLRB, NLRB INTERNAL INSTRUCTION AND GUIDELINES MANUAL -
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS § 10310.2 (1977). The standards discussed by
Nash replaced those announced by Chairman McCulloch in 1962. See text accompany-
ing note 63 supra. Nash's st.ndards for determining whether the Board believes § 10(j)
relief is appropriate emphasize the "public interest" or "public concern" more so than
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John Irving, Nash's successor as General Counsel, labeled
Nash's report on section 10(j) as being of "substantial import-
ance in providing public awareness of how the Agency operates
in an area which previously may not have been widely
known,""8 and commented that Nash's report "is of value not
merely to the academic researcher, but to the labor law practi-
tioner in providing in a context of actual cases a feeling of what
considerations go into an authorization of section 10(j) injunc-
tive relief."
Supported by a belief that the purpose of section 10(j) is
succintly set forth in the legislative history of the section,"°
General Counsel Irving, after his appointment, began to seek
10(j) injunctions with unprecedented vigor. During the first
year of his administration, Irving sought forty-four authoriza-
tions from the Board for section 10(j) injunctions; this com-
pares with the yearly average prior to 1977 of only nine to ten
authorizations per year.8 ' Additionally, Irving instituted
changes in the procedure for obtaining the injunction which
were designed to expedite and improve the way in which sec-
tion 10(j) requests are processed through the Board bureau-
cracy. 2
The increased use of section 10(j) injunctions had been
recommended for several years by the Board's present Chair-
man, John Fanning. 3 In January, 1976, a year and a half before
becoming Chairman, Fanning emphasized his concern with the
increasing number of cases the Board has to process.84 In 1975,
Fanning noted, there were 32,000 charges of unfair labor prac-
tices (corresponding to a 7-10 percent increase in the rate of
did McCulloch's 1962 standards. This increased concern for the public interest may
be a reaction to the public interest discussion which appeared in McLeod v. General
Elec. Co. See notes 133-47 and accompanying text infra.
78. Irving, Current Developments in the Office of the General Counsel-
Substantive, Procedural, Administrative, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR
LAw DEVELOPMENTS 1976, 68, 73-74 (1976). Two months after the Nash report was
issued, Irving (the Board's current General Counsel), while still the Deputy General
Counsel, singled out the increased use of § 10(j) proceedings as a significant contribu-
tion being made by the General Counsel's office during the "aggressive" interim period
between the conclusion of General Counsel Nash's term of office, which took place
shortly before the issuance of the report, and the expected appointment of a new
General Counsel (an appointment which was to go to Irving). Id. at 72.
79. Id. at 73-74. An update through September 30, 1977, on Nash's 10(6) report
will be released sometime during the second half of 1978.
80. Irving, supra note 42, at 357-58.
81. Note 29 supra.
82. For a discussion of the changes instituted by Irving, see note 42 supra.
83. Appointed Board Chairman April, 1977.
84. Fanning, We are Forty -Where Do We Go?, 27 LAB. L.J. 3, 4-5 (1976).
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filing the ULPs per year) which were investigated and pro-
cessed.85 His concern was that the Board's effectiveness in tak-
ing care of those cases would be better served by accelerating
the Board's administrative procedures, which would include
more frequent use of section 10(j).11
In 1969, while serving as a member of the Board, Fanning
commented that
[tihe Board's increasing consideration of the 10(j) injunc-
tion has been inhibited, perhaps, by the procedural impli-
cations as well as by the substantive problems emerging
from the General Electric case. Nevertheless, the holdings
in both the Minnesota Mining and Angle cases . . . offer
substantial guidelines which will un( ,ubtedly be of assis-
tance to the Board in the future exercise of its discretion-
ary authority to seek injunctive relief.87
The actions taken by General Counsel Irving, and sup-
ported by Board Chairman Fanning, to improve the Board's
administrative proceedings will perhaps do much to help in-
crease the use of the section 10(j) injunction. However, the
substantive problems raised by the cases mentioned by Fan-
ning in his 1969 address remain, and if uncorrected by the
courts, will do much to defeat the Board's attempts to increase
the effectiveness of section 10(j).
JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO 10(j) INJUNCTIONS
The NLRB's implementing of a policy of expanded use of
the section 10(j) injunction is only the first step in achieving a
more effective enforcement of the NLRA. Once the Board files
a petition for injunctive relief, the focus of attention shifts to
the courts. The standards to be used by the district courts in
applying section 10(j) to controversies involving unfair labor
practices vary between the district and appellate courts, and
as of yet have not been passed upon by the United States
Supreme Court.8 However, the federal appellate courts, rely-
85. Id. at 4-5.
86. Id. at 7.
87. Fanning, New and Novel Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices, 3 GA. L. REv.
256, 277 (1969). In the same article Fanning noted:
Under section 10(j). . .the Board is authorized to seek an injunction in
any case of unfair labor practice charges against an employer or union.
No mention is made in this section of "reasonable cause," and no other
definitive guideline is provided.
Id. at 275.
88. The issue did come before the Supreme Court once, but the case was settled
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ing on vague statutory language and meager legislative history,
have attempted to formulate standards for district courts to
use in reviewing petitions for section 10(j) injunctions. Unfor-
tunately, there is no agreement among the appellate courts on
what the correct standards should be. This lack of agreement
is viewed by both jurists and Board members as contributing
to the ineffective and infrequent application of section 10(j).8'
Standards for 10(j) Relief
In order to obtain an injunction under section 10(j) the
Board need not prove that the unfair labor practice complained
of actually occurred.'" Courts relying upon the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of section 10(j), however, have
required that a two-prong test be satisfied.
First, the Board must show that there is "reasonable
cause" to believe that an unfair labor practice has occurred."
This prerequisite is usually satisfied when the Regional Direc-
tor demonstrates to the district court that sufficient evidence
exists to show there is a likelihood of a statutory violation.,,
However, it is crucial to the request for section 10(j) injunctive
relief that the Board show more than "reasonable cause" to
believe that the NLRA has been violated. 3 That second and
before being heard by the Justices. See McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 385 U.S. 533
(1967). For a discussion of the General Electric case, see notes 133-147 and accompany-
ing text infra. It should be noted that there are severe practical difficulties in present-
ing the Supreme Court with a case or controversy. Since the § 10(j) injunction only
remains in effect pending Board adjudication of the underlying unfair labor practice
charges, the § 100) issue would typically be mooted before the Supreme Court would
be able to issue a decision.
89. See generally REPORT ON 10(j) PROCEEDINGS, supra, note 77 at 2-3.
90. Douds v. Local 294, Intn'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, 75 F. Supp. 414, 418 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
91. D. McDOwELL & K. HUHN, supra note 38, at 254: see generally Note, 45 TEx.
L. REv. 358 (1966-67).
92. Boire v. Intn'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, 479 F.2d 778, 789 (5th Cir. 1973). The Boire court found
"reasonable cause" to exist "so long as the legal theories are not insubstantial or
frivolous." Id. at 792. See also Sachs v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc., 71 L.R.R.M. 2126 (4th
Cir. 1969). The court in Davis & Hemphill stated: "[Ifn regard to the 'reasonable
cause' element, the standard on review is the usual one applicable to district court
findings of fact: the finding will stand unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 2128.
93. Commenting on the subject, one commentator has noted:
The courts are in general agreement that their discretion in 10(j) cases,
although governed by the necessity for effectuating the statutory policy
. . .must be predicated on something more than reasonable cause to
believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed.
Roth, Injunctive Relief on the NLRB, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 383 (1969). See also
NLRA SECTION 10(J)
more vital prong is that all courts and specific statutory lan-
guage require the Board to demonstrate that, based on the
evidence offered, an injunction would be "just and proper."'
Although it would appear that the Board must satisfy a two-
prong test, the "reasonable cause" requirement of that test is
often overshadowed by courts in their analysis of the more vital
question Of what constitutes "just and proper" relief.
There is no unanimity of opinion in the appellate courts
on what makes injunctive relief "just and proper." The courts
frequently mention that there is a need to restore the parties
to the status quo. 5 They generally recognize that a primary
objective of the enactment of section 10(j) was the preservation
of the status quo pending the issuance of final Board orders or
the completion of litigation in the courts."5 However, courts
often do not agree on the question of what status must be
preserved, and unfortunately no settled definition of status quo
exists.
An example of this conflict and confusion became appar-
ent in 1975 when conflicting definitions of the status quo
emerged in the Second and Fifth Circuits. In Seeler v. Trading
Port, Inc., 7 the Second Circuit found that the status quo was
the situation that "existed before the onset of unfair labor prac-
tices." 8 The Fifth Circuit, in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc.," took the opposite position, defining status quo as "the
last uncontested status which preceded the pending contro-
versy." 100
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1967), where the
court stated:
The district judge's discretion in granting temporary relief under Section
10(j) cannot be activated and motivated solely by a finding of
"reasonable cause" to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred.
More is required to guide his permissive range of discretion.
Id. at 270.
94. The "just and proper" requirement is found in 29 U.S.C. § 160(0) (1970).
95. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (1967); Johnston
v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 341 F.2d 891, 892 (4th Cir. 1965); but see Angle v. Sacks, 382
F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967), where the court noted that after a finding of "just and
proper" circumstances "preservation and restoration of the status quo are then appro-
priate considerations in granting temporary relief pending determination of the issues
by the Board." Id. at 660.
96. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (1967); Angle v.
Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967).
97. 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
98. Id. at 38.
99. 479 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 789. In Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967), the court
indicated that a determination for the need to grant injunctive relief is first considered,
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The differing definitions of the status quo may be reflec-
tive of differences in policy rather than judicially interpreted
doctrines. Nevertheless, they have added confusion and incon-
sistency to judicial determinations of whether injunctive relief
is "just and proper." The need for relief will depend on the
nature of the injury suffered by the complaining party. The
nature of the injury will necessarily be defined in terms of what
the status quo should be. Thus, the courts' inclination to order
injunctive relief may be linked to its perceptions of the relevant
status quo. However, like the reasonable cause analysis dis-
cussed supra, the "status quo" difficulty is usually also glossed
over by the courts in their attempts to articulate a "just and
proper" standard.
What is Just and Proper
Before granting an injunction under section 10(j) a court
must be satisfied that, under the facts before it, equitable relief
is "just and proper."'' 1 Few appellate cases have attempted to
define this statutory requirement. However, those which did so
have found the requirement satisifed in three distinct situa-
tions, when
(1) The alleged unfair labor practice was of a "serious" and
"extraordinary" nature;
(2) The purposes of the national labor policy and the
NLRA would be frustrated if injunctive relief was not granted;
and
(3) Irreparable harm has been caused to the parties in-
volved, or the public interest has been damaged by the illegal
activity.
Extraordinary circumstances standard. In essence, the
extraordinary circumstances standard requires the district
court to grant section 10(j) relief if circumstances exist which
merit temporary relief. Such a nebulous and inherently circula-
tory guide is difficult to apply on a broad basis, since it requires
a case-by-case analysis to determine its applicability. This lim-
itation probably explains why it has been adopted by only one
circuit.102
followed by a consideration of the "(p)reservation and restoration of the status quo."
Id. at 660.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1970). For test of the statute, see text accompanying note
36 supra.
102. The Second Circuit in McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
1966), adopted a similar standard when it overruled a District Court's granting of a §
10(j) injunction upon the basis of a "public interest" standard. The Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the conflict between the district and circuit
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In adopting the extraordinary circumstance standard, the
Eighth Circuit, in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.
v. Meter, 03 reversed a district court which had enjoined the
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company from refusing
to bargain collectively with its employees' bargaining repre-
sentative. 04 The company had refused to bargain because the
representative included, as part of its committee, individuals
who were non-voting advisors and who normally represented
other unions which had bargained with the company in the
past.05 The Eighth Circuit's decision, which was limited to the
injunction issued by the district court, took note of the irrepar-
able harm and public interest standards adopted in other cir-
cuits, but reasoned that section 10(j) was meant to be "reserved
for a more serious and extraordinary sets of circumstances
where the unfair labor practices, unless contained, would have
an adverse and deleterious effect on the rights of the aggrieved
party . . .,.
The court concluded that the district court record was
devoid of any evidence which would support a finding that an
extraordinary set of circumstances existed to warrant injunc-
tive relief.07 Although the court relied upon an extraordinary
circumstances standard to reverse the district court injunction,
it did indicate that even if it had applied standards employed
by other circuits to the circumstances (e.g., the employer's
refusal to bargain posed a serious threat to the public interests
or that the employer's refusal would result in irreparable injury
to the union unless enjoined), it would not have been able to
stay the injunction based on the facts in the record.' °"
The extraordinary circumstances standard apparently
conditions the Board's decision to seek relief on the fortuity
that a court will deem "extraordinary" the particular circum-
courts. However, before presentation of the issues, the conflicting parties resolved their
difficulties. The Court set aside the circuit's judgment, but let stand the question of
whether it favored the district court's "public interest" standard over that adopted by
the circuit court. The granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court might raise the
inference that the rationale employed by the circuit is at least subject to review, if not
totally incorrect. If that is a valid assumption, it may suggest that the Supreme Court
considered the public interest standard to be the just and proper standard for deter-
mining the necessity of granting a § 10(j) injunction request. See notes 133-147 and
accompanying text infra.
103. 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967).
104. Meter v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 273 F. Supp. 659 (D. Minn. 1967).
105. Id. at 267-69.
106. 385 F.2d at 270.
107. Id. at 273.
108. Id.
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stances presented to it for review. The inability of the Board
to look into the future and foretell how each district court
might view a set of circumstances is obvious. Therefore, the
only real value of this standard may be that it serves as a
reminder to courts that the opposite extreme-granting section
10(j) relief in every case in which quick relief might conceiv-
ably be helpful-would be just as difficult for the Board to
engineer. Therefore, to expand the standard from one circuit's
decision into a general rule applicable to all district courts
would probably put a halt to the recently expanded use of
section 10(j).
Frustration of the NLRA purpose standard. The Tenth
Circuit in Angle v. Sacks,'0 upheld a district court's granting
of a section 10(j) injunction based upon a showing by the Board
that the employer confronted with a union organizational
drive, interfered with his employees' rights under the NLRA
through interrogations, discriminatory discharges, and a se-
lected wage increase, all designed to destroy employee interest
in union representation."10
The court found sufficient cause existed to believe that the
purposes of the NLRA would be defeated if temporary relief
were not granted. This reasonable apprehension, the court con-
cluded, satisfied the "just and proper" requirement of the stat-
ute.'
Basing its decision on the same legislative history analyzed
by the Minnesota Mining"' court, the Angle court"' could find
nothing in that history which suggested that section 10(j) in-
junctions were applicable only to situations of "heavy and
meaningful repercussions""' or ones in which a "demonstrably
prejudicial impact""' 5 on the public might occur.
On the contrary, the court postulated that the Board may
seek relief if the "circumstances call for such relief.""' This
would include, the court reasoned, cases where the mere pas-
sage of time might defeat the purposes of the NLRA"'7 or
109. 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967).
110. Id. at 658.
111. Id. at 660-61.
112. 385 F.2d at 269-70.
113. Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d at 659-60.
114. Id. at 659.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 660.
117. Id. at 659. See also NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 389 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1967).
In Aerovox the circuit court adopted a "frustration of the statute" analysis of the term
"just and proper" in NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964). Section 10(e) provides
for temporary relief after the Board has made a final determination but before the
appropriate circuit court has granted enforcement. Although the specific function of
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"where the continuance of illegal activities would hinder the
Board's determination of issues or the implementation of its
decision in ULP proceedings.""' 8
In 1969 the Fourth Circuit, in Sachs v. Davis & Hemphill,
Inc., I9 employed the same standard adopted by the Angle court
in affirming a district court's granting of a 10(j) injunction.'21
In Davis & Hemphill the employer had withdrawn recognition
from the union at a time when it did not have a reasonable
basis for a doubt of the union's majority status and had begun
hiring replacements for his employees striking in protest of his
action.''
Relying heavily on the legislative history section reported
in Angle, ' the court found the "just and proper" requirement
for granting section 10(j) relief turned on "whether there exists
a probability that the purposes of the Act will be frustrated
unless temporary relief is granted."'2
The court reasoned that the NLRA was intended to pro-
mote industrial peace by encouraging collective bargaining as
a substitute for industrial strife.'2' It noted that if the employer
is permitted to continue its refusal to bargain until the Board
can decide the issues presented by the case, he will be able to
wear down the support for the union.'2 The court concluded
that if this is allowed to continue, the Act's purpose of protect-
ing employees, as well as the normal procedures used by the
Board in resolving conflicts, will have been frustrated.12
The Angle and Davis & Hemphill courts' rulings that the
district court need not find "heavy and meaningful repercus-
sions" in order to grant a section 10(j) injunction are clearly
contrary to the Minnesota Mining court's finding "a more seri-
ous and extraordinary set of circumstances" must exist for a
district court to grant section 10(j) relief. 27 The fact that each
court relied on the same two paragraphs in the Senate reports
this section differs from that of § 10(j), the Fourth Circuit felt that the "just and
proper" clause should be read the same way in both sections. This reading caused the
court to deny the relief requested.
118. Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d at 660.
119. 71 L.R.R.M. 2126 (4th Cir. 1969).
120. Sachs v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 142 (D.C. Md. 1969).
121. 71 L.R.R.M. at 2126-27.
122. Id. at 2127, citing Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967).
123. 71 L.R.R.M. at 2128.
124. Id. at 2129.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 385 F.2d at 270.
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points out the confusion which exists among the circuits.,"
The "frustration of the NLRA purpose" standard shares
the same weakness as the "extraordinary circumstances" test.
No judicially desirable formula can predict when any action by
an employer or union will frustrate the purposes of the NLRA.
Therefore, unlike the extraordinary circumstances test which
would appear to deny section 10(j) relief in all but the most
unusual situations, the test postulated by the Angle and Davis
& Hemphill courts would make every ULP case susceptible to
a section 10(j) injunction because every ULP case not immedi-
ately settled arguably defeats the purpose of the NLRA. Such
a broad interpretation of the use of section 10(j) could not have
been the intent of Congress in 1947, particularly when viewed
from the perspective of congressional abhorrence of the pre-
1930 abuses of the labor injunction. 2 '
Irreparable harm or public interest standard? Johnston v.
J.P. Stevens & Company,30 a case which came before the
Fourth Circuit in 1965, was one of the first appellate court cases
to wrestle at length with the problem of determining the re-
quirements a district court must follow in satisfying section
10(j)'s statutory "just and proper" standard. In a cautious per
curiam opinion, the court agreed with the district court that
the "correct rule"'' for determining the standards to use in
section 10(j) hearings centers upon congressional intent to give
the Board power to seek injunctions when it is in the public
interest, particularly, the court indicated, when it is necessary
to "prevent persons who are violating the Act from accomplish-
ing their unlawful purpose .... "I"
The next year a district court in McLeod v. General Elec-
tric Co. 113 reached a similar conclusion and in so doing provided
the Supreme Court with an opportunity to articulate the stan-
dards district courts should apply in granting section 10(j) in-
junctions. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined to pass
on the merits when the issue being litigated had been mooted.
128. For the two paragraphs relied upon by the Angle, Davis & Hemphill and
Minnesota Mining courts, see text accompanying note 36 supra.
129. For a discussion of pre-1930 labor injunction abuses, see text accompanying
notes 18-24 supra.
130. 341 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1965).
131. Id. at 892.
132. Id. In the Fourth Circuit's short per curiam opinion there was no explana-
tion for what it considered the public interest to be, which status quo was to be
restored, or what Congress intended by the term "just and proper." The court, how-
ever, did deny the Board's appeal. Thus it did not grant the injunction sought.
133. 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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The district court in General Electric enjoined an em-
ployer from refusing to enter into contract-renewal negotiations
with a union because the employer viewed as unacceptable and
impermissible the union's asserted right to designate as non-
voting members of its negotiating committee seven individuals
who normally would represent other unions in bargaining with
the employer for other employees. 34
Although the district court conceded that a section 10(j)
injunction is a drastic remedy which "ought to be reserved for
situations of special need,"' 35 it rejected the employer's conten-
tion that injunctive relief under section 10(j) was only available
to obtain relief in cases of "flagrant" violations.3 6 Instead the
court reasoned that "the remedy of section 10(j) is surely ap-
propriate and available when the impact upon the public inter-
est is grave enough to justify swifter corrective action than the
normal process of Board adjudication and court enforce-
ment."'37 The court found the case before it "clearly" qualified
under that standard.138
Upon appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and vacated
the injunction. 9 In reversing the district court decision, the
circuit court concluded that temporary injunctive relief prior
to the Board's hearing and decision was available only where
demonstrably "necessary . . . to prevent any irreparable
harm."" The court did not find this standard satisfied in the
instant case.
To support its ruling, the court noted that section 10(j) is
one of the few exceptions to the almost blanket prohibition
against the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, an excep-
tion which was to be used only in extraordinary circumstan-
ces.' It did not elaborate on what it considered to be extraordi-
nary circumstances or irreparable harm except to say that it
did not exist in the present case.'
134. Id. at 693.
135. Id. at 707.
136. Id. at 708-09. The district court indicated that it could find nothing in the
language of the statute or its legislative history to support the restrictive use view
proposed by the employer.
137. Id. at 708.
138. Id.
139. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d at 850.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 849.
142. Id. at 850. In addition to not demonstrating that a § 10(j) injunction was
necessary to prevent irreparable harm, the court found that the Board did not prove
the injunction was needed to preserve the status quo. Id. That two-prong test is
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The Board then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision and was
granted a stay of the court of appeals' judgment pending the
certiorari proceedings. 3 As a result of the bargaining which
took place while the injunction was in effect when the case was
pending on certiorari, the parties reached an agreement on the
terms of a new collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme
Court subsequently granted the petition for certiorari but, in
view of the supervening execution of a contract, declined to
pass on the proper construction of section 10(j).'" It remanded
the case to the district court to determine the effect of the
contract execution upon the appropriateness of injunctive re-
lief."5
The Supreme Court did, however, note that the district
courts' "impact upon the public interest" test differed from the
court of appeals' "irreparable harm" standard,' without ex-
pressing its support for either one."7
"the familiar, centuries-old standards for equitable relief." Address by Chairman
Frank McCulloch, Federal Bar Association and the George Washington University
National Law Center Labor Relations Institute (Feb. 15, 1968), reprinted in [1968]
LAB. REL. Y.B. 114, 120.
143. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 87 S.Ct. 5 (1966)(memorandum of Harlan).
Harlan granted the Board's application for a stay, pending certiorari proceedings, of a
judgment of the Second Circuit setting aside a temporary injunction issued by a
district court. In granting the stay, Harlan pointed out that the standards governing
the application of § 10(j) had never been decided by the Supreme Court, despite the
section's continuing importance in the proper administration of the NLRA. Id. at 6.
Harlan's concern was echoed later in the same year by Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth
Circuit who noted: "There has as yet been no authoritative pronouncement by the
Supreme Court on the standards governing application of 10(j). Sachs v. Davis
& Hemphill, 71 L.R.R.M. 2126, 2127 (4th Cir. 1969).
144. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 385 U.S. 533 (1967). Commenting on the
outcome of the case, former Board Chairman McCulloch noted: "[o]f course we are
pleased that General Electric and I.U.E. achieved a satisfactory solution of their differ-
ences in 1966, but their success at the bargaining table has robbed us-at least tempo-
rarily of Supreme Court guidance as to the proper scope of Section 10(j)." McCulloch,
supra note 142, at 120.
McCulloch's belief that the lack of clear standards would only be a temporary
state of affairs was possibly overly-optimistic. Almost twelve years have passed, yet
the question of proper standards for § 10(j) injunctions is still unresolved. For a more
in-depth analysis of the General Electric decision, see Comment, Temporary Injunc-
tions Under Section 10(j) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181 (1969).
145. 385 U.S. at 535.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Third Circuit, in Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138
(3d Cir. 1975), lent its support to the public interest standard. In Hartz Mountain, the
NLRB sought to restrain the employer from giving recognition to a collective bargain-
ing agreement with a union which allegedly had been illegally-favored over a compet-
ing union. The court balanced the public interest of the employees who benefited by
the contract against the purely private rights of the disadvantaged union and denied
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It would appear obvious that an employer's refusal to bar-
gain with an employees' union, as in General Electric, could
produce irreparable harm to the union or erode union support.
However, since prediction of irreparable harm would depend
upon such dynamic, indiscernable criteria as the strength of a
union's support, the effect of an employer's actions on em-
ployee morale or the intimidation power that a union may have
over employees, determining when they are not present may
prove difficult.
In addition to difficulties in application, the irreparable
harm standard may be inconsistent with the legislative intent
of section 106). Section 10(1) directs the Board to seek tempo-
rary injuctive relief in order to remedy certain union ULP's.145
Furthermore, section 10(1) provides that a district court shall
not issue a temporary injunction order without notice unless
the petition alleges that "substantial and irreparable injury to
the charging party will be unavoidable."' 49 Had Congress in-
tended that the irreparable harm standard apply to petitions
for section 10(j) relief, it could easily have embodied that stan-
dard in the language of that section. However this did not
occur; such an absence supports an inference that Congress
did not consider the -irreparable harm standard appropriate
for circumstances covered by section 10(j).
One purpose of the NLRA is to protect the rights of the
public from infringement caused by labor disputes.'5 There-
fore, the public interest standard presented by the district
court may be more consistent with congressional intent than
any of the standards discussed above.
However adoption of the public interest standard could
preclude temporary relief in cases involving a relatively small
number of persons who are threatened with irreparable in-
jury. '5 Perhaps in response to this drawback, one commenta-
the requested injunction. In the court's view, Congress has left it to the courts to
determine what is in the public interest through case-by-case analysis. Id. at 142. If
competing public interests appear in a given case, the court would permit them to be
balanced without regard to general equitable principles. Id. at 143. For further discus-
sion of the Hartz Mountain decision, see White, Section 10(j) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 21 VILL. L. REv. 541 (1975-76).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970). Unlike the discretionary nature of section 10(j),
section 10(l) is a mandatory provision that directs the NLRB to seek temporary in-
junctive relief to remedy certain union unfair labor practices. Compared to the Board's
relatively infrequent use of section 10(j), union unfair labor practices have been exten-
sively enjoined under section 10(l).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970). See Comment, supra note 35, at 850; Comment,
supfa note 144, at 188-89; McCulloch, supra note 18, at 91-94.
150. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141(b)-151 (1970).
151. For example, in Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967), the contro-
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tor has suggested that if the existence of unfair labor practices
is certain, the district court should grant section 10(j) injunc-
tive relief upon a showing of even slight harm to the public. In
contrast, if the existence of unfair labor practices is less certain,
the court should require proof of a substantial impact upon the
public interest.'52
A solution. It may be possible to harmonize the conflicting
interpretations of the appellate courts by adopting a hybrid
similar to the one used by the Fifth Circuit in Boire v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. 53 In Boire, the court found
the granting of a section 10(j) injunction "just and proper" in
order to "prevent frustration of the remedial purposes available
to the Board, to protect the public interest, and to prevent
irreparable harm."''
In affirming the district court order granting a section 10(j)
injunction, the Boire court found there was reasonable cause to
believe the Teamsters and four of its local unions violated their
bargaining obligation under the NLRA.'55 The labor unions had
insisted, over the protest of a trucking firm, that the firm ex-
tend the provisions of the collective bargaining contract to its
four newly established terminals. In order to force compliance
with their demand, the unions invoked the grievance arbitra-
tion provisions of the contract and struck and picketed the
trucking firm.' 6
The circuit court noted that if the trucking firm had re-
sisted the union's demands, there would be widespread strike
activity which would result in severe financial loss and impair-
ment of important public services.' Thus, the court invoked
the public interest standard as outlined by the district court in
McLeod. However, if the trucking firm capitulated to the union
versy involved a small unit of employees. Even if there were a strike instigated by the
employer's unfair labor practices, it would probably have had little demonstrable
impact on the general public. Hence, injunctive relief may be denied if the public
interest standard is utilized by a reviewing court, despite legitimate needs.
152. Comment, The Use of Section 10(j) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
in Employer Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 1976 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 850-52 (quoting from
Note, A Temporary Injunction of an Unfair Labor Practice Shall Issue Only On a
Showing That It Is Necessary To Preserve the Status Quo or To Prevent Irreparable
Harm, 45 Texas L. Rev. 358, 363 (1966)).
153. 479 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973). The standards set out by that decision were
affirmed two years later in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir.
1975). In Pilot Freight the court noted "writing on a virtual tabula rasa, the Boire v.
Teamsters decision, .... set the boundaries of section 10(j) relief in this circuit." Id.
at 1188.
154. 479 F.2d at 789.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 783, 785.
157. Id. at 788.
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demands, the union would become so entrenched in the state
that any ultimate Board decision would be of no value to the
trucking firm or to the firm's employees who may not have
wanted to vote for a union.'58 That not only would circumvent
and frustrate the Board's remedial provisions (e.g., the Angle
and Davis & Hemphill standard), but would also cause possible
irreparable harm (e.g., the circuit court's standard in McLeod)
to the firm's employees by denying their rights under the Act
to choose, without restraint or coercion, a bargaining represent-
ative.
The Boire court was successfully able to use a combination
of standards to find the granting of a section 10(j) injunction
to be "just and proper." However, the court's decision points
out the lack of agreement between the circuit courts in defining
the "just and proper" requirement of section 10(j).
CONCLUSION
Whenever possible, private machinery should be encour-
aged to settle disputes. However, it should be realized that
those situations where an employer or union is engaging in
obviously unlawful conduct the injunction has proven to be an
efficient means of enforcing this country's labor policies.
It is the duty of the National Labor Relations Board and
the courts to interpret and to apply the provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Congress has declared that the
policy of this country is to eliminate industrial strife and any
obstructions to the free flow of commerce, be they employee or
employer initiated. Acting pursuant to its congressional man-
date as well as expressed advice, the National Labor Relations
Board has indicated that it plans to use section 10(j) injunc-
tions in a greater role in the solution of future labor disputes.
The assumption of an active role by the courts in the imple-
mentation of the Board's new policy will require the creation
of more concrete standards than have been necessary under the
Board's previous policy of restricted use of section 10(j). The
creation of more concrete standards does not require rigid
guidelines to be established but instead would insure more
uniformity between the several circuits than now presently
exist. If those standards do not eventually come from the
United States Supreme Court, the future of a valuable tool to
promote the policies of the Act will remain in doubt.
Bruce W. Burns
158. Id.
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